Why would a savvy investor give away her edge? This paper examines the paradox of informed traders who publicly disclose superior information about firms. We develop a dynamic model in which a short-sighted, risk-averse and atomistic raider strategically decides whether to reveal her private information about a firm's fundamentals. Under these conditions, we show that disclosure is optimal when the information is either positive or sufficiently negative, as doing so allows the raider to steer prices in her favor. Our analysis further highlights the central role of trading constraints in shaping disclosure incentives. When short-selling constraints are tight, the raider is less likely to disclose negative information; when she does, disclosure typically signals exceptionally bad news. These insights align with an empirical analysis of damning reports issued by dedicated short-bias funds between 2010 and 2021: the worse the information they convey and the tighter the constraints, the sharper the market reaction.